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In this work, we investigate two groundwater inventory management schemes with multiple users in a
dynamic game-theoretic structure: (i) under the centralized management scheme, users are allowed to
pump water from a common aquifer with the supervision of a social planner, and (ii) under the decen-
tralized management scheme, each user is allowed to pump water from a common aquifer making usage
decisions individually in a non-cooperative fashion. This work is motivated by the work of Saak and Pet-
erson [14], which considers a model with two identical users sharing a common aquifer over a two-per-
iod planning horizon. In our work, the model and results of Saak and Peterson [14] are generalized in
several directions. We ﬁrst build on and extend their work to the case of n non-identical users distributed
over a common aquifer region. Furthermore, we consider two different geometric conﬁgurations overly-
ing the aquifer, namely, the strip and the ring conﬁgurations. In each conﬁguration, general analytical
results of the optimal groundwater usage are obtained and numerical examples are discussed for both
centralized and decentralized problems.
 2011 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.1. Introduction
Effective management of limited resources shared by multiple
users is becoming of more importance due to increasing pressures
resulting from demographic and/or economic growth and ecologi-
cal deterioration. Such resources include ﬁsheries, water and clean
air. They suffer from either lack of enforceable private property
rights or their designation of common/public property. Further-
more, these resources exhibit an interesting property. They tend
to move from one location to another depending on the extent of
usage. Underground water laterally ﬂows within an aquifer along
with the hydrological gradient (difference between low and high
water levels); schools of ﬁsh travel to other locations to run away
from heavy ﬁshing in one location; pollution at a point is dissi-
pated degrading the overall quality over a larger area. This prop-
erty permits gaming behavior among users. In this paper, we
focus on groundwater as one of a number of limited resources.
Our motivation comes from the following. Scarcity of water - for
personal and industrial/agricultural use - is increasing in both
absolute and relative terms. Shortages observed in rainfall, adverse
micro-climatic changes, contamination of groundwater reservoirs
(aquifers) due to increasing industrial and human pollution result
in a decrease in the amount of water of certain quality ﬁt for use.
Increases in demand for water due to growth in the overall popu-ll rights reserved.
ku@bilkent.edu.tr (Ü. Gürler),lations and changes in consumption patterns result in the relative
scarcity of this precious resource. In arid and semi-arid regions of
the globe, the scarcity is reaching critical levels. The gaming behav-
ior of users may be detrimental for many communities for some
generations to come.
Earlier works on groundwater management have argued that
welfare gain from applying different policies and disadvantages
of gaming behavior are likely to be negligible. Speciﬁcally, Gisser
and Sanchez [7] have shown that, if the common and freely ac-
cessed aquifer’s storage capacity is large enough, a free market
(decentralized) behavior and optimal centralized control strategies
perform equally well in terms of the welfare gain from groundwa-
ter usage. Allen and Gisser [1] extended their work by considering
a non-linear demand function. They also conﬁrmed that if water
rights are properly deﬁned and if the aquifer’s storage capacity
is large, then the difference between no control strategy and opti-
mal control strategy is small, and, thus, can be ignored for practi-
cal policy considerations. However, Negri [11] objected to these
ﬁndings on the grounds that the fundamental assumption of
openly accessed groundwater aquifer is not valid. An open access
aquifer assumes that the overlying users can use as much of it as
they wish regardless of their location. However, for most aquifers,
this is not possible since access to groundwater is usually limited
since not all users own the overlying land as well as the water
rights. Furthermore, the lateral ﬂows within the aquifer are not
instantaneous. Saak and Peterson [14] address these inadequacies
by considering a game-theoretic restricted access aquifer with
identical users over a ﬁnite planning horizon (of two periods),
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law. Their contribution is twofold: they model underground
hydrological behavior more realistically and they incorporate pos-
sibility of lack of information about the ground transmissivity by
users. However, their analysis is restricted to two identical users.
In this work, we build on their model and extend it to the case
of multiple non-identical users with two different geometric con-
ﬁgurations overlying the aquifer. We investigate two groundwater
inventory management schemes with multiple users in a dynamic
game-theoretic structure: (i) under the centralized management
scheme, users are allowed to pump water from a common aquifer
with the supervision of a social planner, and (ii) under the decen-
tralized management scheme, each user is allowed to use water
from a common aquifer making usage decisions individually in a
non-cooperative fashion. In our work, the model and results of
Saak and Peterson [14] are generalized in several directions. We
ﬁrst extend their work to the multiple non-identical user setting
with two different geometric conﬁgurations overlying the aquifer,
namely, the strip and ring conﬁgurations. The non-identical struc-
ture among users is represented in the differences of the parame-
ters of each user’s proﬁt function. The rationale behind our
extension to both strip and ring conﬁgurations naturally arise
when there are more than two users, since with two users they
are identical. In fact, this resulting variation in the conﬁguration
types itself motivates the extension to more than two users. Apart
from geometric description, it is more important to note that the
strip and ring structures mainly differ in the number of neighbor-
ing users that each user interacts, where in the latter one each user
interacts with two neighbors. In each conﬁguration, namely, in
both the decentralized and centralized problems, general analyti-
cal results of the optimal water usage are obtained. We are able
to obtain closed form optimal solutions for special cases of param-
eter values. Our results reduce to those of Saak and Peterson [14] in
the case of two identical users, and validate some of their conjec-
tures about multiple users.
In our study, we show the existence of a unique Nash equilib-
rium in both conﬁgurations and provide the solution structure for
the decentralized problemswith n non-identical users. For identical
users, we also manage to derive explicit solutions for the optimal
water usage. It is shown that in strip conﬁguration with n identical
users, the optimal Nash equilibrium usage quantities oscillate
about the optimal Nash equilibrium usage quantities of the ring
conﬁguration. Our numerical results indicate that as the under-
ground water transmission coefﬁcient increases, users become
more greedy and tend to use more water. The analysis for the cen-
tralized problem in the strip and ring conﬁgurations reveals that
the optimal solution of groundwater usage is symmetric, unique
across users and independent of the characteristics of the ground-
water aquifer. This generalizes one of the important ﬁndings of Saak
and Peterson [14] regarding the optimal equilibrium water usage.
An important question that might be raised by a policy maker is
about the possibility of coordinating the groundwater system by
achieving the centralized solution in the decentralized game theo-
retic setting via a single pricing mechanism. Our results show that
in both conﬁgurations, this is impossible to be realized. Addition-
ally, we consider a variant of our model with salvage possibility
for left over water as a proxy for extending the problem horizon.
Our study focuses on the optimal water consumption of multi-
ple users with lateral transmissivity of groundwater among
adjacent users under centralized and decentralized management
schemes. Another work that considers centralized water manage-
ment under a different setting is by Haouari and Azaiez [8]. Their
work differs from ours in that the decision-maker (local authori-
ties) aims at selecting crops and allocating water and land to them
in order to maximize the total linear proﬁt obtained from annual
and seasonal crops for the whole year of the plan. Their model isaddressed centrally for a limited availability of water stock without
allowing any ‘‘commonality’’ of the water source which creates a
gaming behavior in the model. In our work, because of the aquifer’s
commonality, a strategic-form game arises between the n- non-
identical users, and, hence, the water management problem is ad-
dressed centrally and decentrally. Also, our proﬁt function is of
quadratic form. There are also a number of other studies in litera-
ture that consider conjunctive use of multiple water resources such
as Azaiez and Hariga [2], Azaiez [3] and Azaiez et al. [4]. Other re-
lated studies on water management and operations models can be
found in Yeh [15] and Labadie [10].
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 includes
the preliminaries and the speciﬁcs of the model. Section 3 presents
the analytical results of the two water management schemes for
the strip conﬁguration, while those related to the ring conﬁgura-
tion are presented in Section 4. Numerical results are presented
in Section 5. Section 6 concludes our work.
2. Preliminaries and basic model properties
In this section, we lay out some common assumptions andmod-
el properties in our analysis. We consider a system of n users who
are non-identical in their characteristics conﬁgured over and using
a common groundwater aquifer to maximize their proﬁts dis-
counted over a ﬁnite planning horizon of two periods in either a
centralized or decentralized manner. User i has access to an under-
ground water stock of xi,t at the beginning of period t, for i = 1, . . . ,n
and t = 1, 2. There is also an aquifer rechargewi,1 = w1 for all i at the
beginning of Period 2; we assume that recharge does not alleviate
the underground water level above the base level xi,0. We allow the
cost and revenue parameters to vary over time among users. Let ui,t
denote the amount of groundwater pumped (and used) by user i,
i = 1, . . . ,n, in period t, t = 1, 2. It is assumed that ui,t 6 xi,t, which im-
plies that groundwater is essentially a private resource within each
period and a user can not access groundwater lying beneath an-
other user. As water levels change locally due to consumption by
each user, water in the aquifer may ﬂow laterally between adjacent
users (between the adjacent areas corresponding to the users’
plots). The inter-period lateral ﬂow of groundwater between adja-
cent users is governed by Darcy’s Law. This natural law states that
the rate of ﬂow of groundwater through a certain medium (soil) is
proportionally related to the hydrologic gradient (i.e. the driving
force acting on water) and the conductivity of the medium (i.e.
the measure of the ability of medium to transmit water), a, as sta-
ted in Hornberger et al. [9]. The water stock level of a user in a per-
iod will be expressed as a function of the previous period’s stock
level of the user, the groundwater usage of the user and the neigh-
bors, as well as the aquifer’s hydrological properties. In the analysis
below, we assume that initial water stocks xi,1, are identical for all
users i = 1, . . . ,n; furthermore, the soil properties are assumed sim-
ilar so that all users’ water stocks are subject to the same a. The
interaction in the availabilities of groundwater stocks among users
makes their decentralized and centralized problems non-
separable.
The proﬁt functions of users are of quadratic form similar to
Saak and Peterson [14]. The proﬁt function of groundwater usage
realized by user i for time period t is given by
gi;tðui;t; xi;tÞ ¼ ½qi;tai;t  ci;tðxi;0  xi;tÞui;t  0:5ðqi;tbi;t þ ci;tÞu2i;t ; ð1Þ
where xi,0 = xi,1 and the cost-revenue parameters qi,t,ai,t,bi,t,ci,t > 0
and satisfy the following condition
ðqi;tbi;t þ ci;tÞxi;0 < qi;tai;t < ð2qi;tbi;t þ ci;tÞxi;0: ð2Þ
The condition in Eq. (2) on the parameters follows from themod-
els in Saak and Peterson [14] and is needed for someof our structural
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it is assumed that the pumped undergroundwater is used for irriga-
tion of crops. The proﬁt function in (1) is a special case of the general
proﬁt function mi,t(qi,t yi,t(ui,t)  si,t(ui,t,xi,t)  ki,t), which has an
empirical estimated speciﬁcation in Peterson and Ding [13], where
mi,t is utility-of-income function, qi,t is the price per unit of the crop,
yi,t is theyield of the cropwhich is dependenton theamountofwater
used, si,t(ui,t,xi,t) is the cost of pumped groundwater (a joint function
of water usage and groundwater stock level) and ki,t is the ﬁxed cost
of infrastructural (farming) inputs. When we assume a linear
utility-of-income function, (mi,t(z) = z), a quadratic yield function
yi;tðui;tÞ ¼ ai;tui;t  0:5bi;tu2i;t , a quadratic groundwater extraction cost
si;tðui;t ; xi;tÞ ¼ ci;t ðxi;0  xi;tÞui;t þ 0:5u2i;t
h i
and omit the ﬁxed costs
(ki,t = 0), we get the proﬁt function in Eq. (1). For this proﬁt expres-
sion, we have the following key property.
Lemma 1. Positivity, continuity, concavity
(i) For ui,t 6 xi,t 6 xi,0, the function gi,t(ui,t, xi,t) is strictly increasing
in ui,t, i = 1, . . . ,n, t = 1, 2.
(ii) The function gi,t(ui,t, xi,t) is continuous and concave in ui,t,
i = 1, . . . ,n, t = 1, 2.Proof. All proofs are provided in the Online Supplement. h
We construct our models with non-identical users in the gen-
eral case. The differences among users may be due to differences
in the yield and cost parameters of the users. The differences in
the yield parameters (qi,t,ai,t and bi,t) among users represent differ-
ent cropping and irrigation patterns adopted by users, whereas the
difference in the cost parameters (ci,t and ki,t) represents different
technologies and machinery utilized in pumping groundwater
from the common aquifer and in irrigating the grown crops. The
geography of the aquifer region and the soil properties (hydrology)
of the land being planted and irrigated characterize possible differ-
ent transmission structures for the users conﬁgured over the com-
mon aquifer. Additionally, the speciﬁc conﬁguration of the users
over this aquifer contribute to the water dynamics over time
among users. In this work, we consider two conﬁgurations - the
strip and ring conﬁgurations - within the general framework as
outlined above.
3. Strip Conﬁguration
We consider the system of n non-identical users distributed
adjacently in a strip over the common groundwater aquifer. The
setting may be envisioned as an abstraction of a more complex
geographic conﬁguration with the only restriction that each user
has at most two neighbors. For one dimensional ﬂow of groundwa-
ter, there will be lateral ﬂow of groundwater among adjacently lo-
cated users. Then, the extreme users on the strip (the ﬁrst and the
last) will receive groundwater ﬂow only from one neighbor,
whereas for all other (non-extreme) users, ﬂow will be from the
two neighbors on both sides. Hence, for i = 1 and j = 2 and, i = n
and j = n  1, the lateral ﬂow of groundwater in period 1 is given
by Qj,i = a[(xi,1  ui,1 +wi,1)  (xj,1  uj,1 + wj,1)] = a(ui,1  uj,1),
where a 2 [0,0.5] is the lateral ﬂow (aquifer transmissivity) coefﬁ-
cient, summarizing the hydrologic dynamics of the groundwater
aquifer, and (xi,1  ui,1 +wi,1)  (xj,1  uj,1 + wj,1) is the hydrologic
gradient (the difference in hydrologic head between the wells).
Similarly, by applying Darcy’s Law in period 1, a non-extreme user
i, i = 1, . . . ,n  1, would have lateral inﬂows Qi1,i and Qi+1,i, where
Qi1,i = a(ui,1  ui1,1) and Qi+1,i = a(ui,1  ui+1,1). In this conﬁgura-
tion, we consider below the two kinds of decision making - decen-
tralized and centralized problems.3.1. The decentralized problem
In the decentralized problem, each user has the objective of
maximizing his/her own total discounted proﬁt over the horizon
of two periods by choosing the water usage quantity in each per-
iod. But, at the same time, each user has to take into account
usages of all other users due to the commonality of the under-
ground aquifer. This generates an n  player normal-form game,
where the water usage quantity in each period is the strategy
of a player (a user), and the payoff function is given by a user’s
expected total discounted proﬁt over the horizon. The strategy
space of any user is constructed from the other users’ decisions
of water usage and the available (and ﬁnite) underground water
stocks in any period. In this section, we consider this game-theo-
retic model and investigate its properties. The decentralized prob-
lem above can be stated formally as a dynamic program as
follows. Let Ci;tð~ut ;~xtÞ denote the maximum expected total proﬁt
under an optimal water usage schedule for user i for periods t
through the end of horizon, where ~ut ¼ ðu1;t ; . . . ;un;tÞT is the water
usage vector for all users in period t and ~xt ¼ ðx1;t ; . . . ; xn;tÞT is the
water stock vector for all users at the beginning of period t. For
t = 1, 2, the decentralized problem of user i, i = 1, . . . ,n, is solved
by the following dynamic program
Ci;tð~ut;~xtÞ ¼ maxui;t Ci;tð
~ut ;~xtÞ
¼ max
ui;t
gi;tðui;t ; xi;tÞ þ bi;tCi;tþ1ð~utþ1;~xtþ1Þ
h i
; ð3Þ
s:t: xi;tþ1 ¼
xi;t þwi;t  ð1 aÞui;t  auj;t;
ði; jÞ 2 fð1;2Þ; ðn;n 1Þg
xi;t þwi;t  ð1 2aÞui;t  aðui1;t þ uiþ1;tÞ;
i ¼ 2; . . . ;n 1;
8>><>>: ð4Þ
0 6 ui;t 6 xi;t : ð5Þ
In the above problem, the decision variables for this simultaneous
optimization problem are the water usage quantities of each user
in each period, ui,t. Eq. (4) corresponds to the recursive temporal
relationship among the water stocks of the users as dictated by
Darcy’s Law. In our formulation, we assume the same hydrologi-
cal transmissivity coefﬁcient a across the strip for all users and
all periods, as it would be the case for short time horizons. Eq.
(5) gives the constraint for each user’s water usage. We assume
that the discount rate bi,t = b with 0 6 b 6 1; and set xi,1 = x1,
wi,1 = w1 and C

i;3ð~u3;~x3Þ  0 for all ~x3;~u3 and for i = 1, . . . ,n. (We
later relax the condition on C3ð~u3;~x3Þ). We are now ready to exam-
ine some properties of the optimal solution to the above formula-
tion. We ﬁrst provide the structural results for the objective
function, Ci;tð~ut;~xtÞ. From Lemma 1 (i), immediately we have the
following.
Corollary 1. The within-period proﬁt function gi,t(ui,t, xi,t) attains its
maximum at ui;t ¼ xi;t ; i ¼ 1; . . . ;n; t ¼ 1;2.
This result has two implications. (i) The myopic solution of the
problem is trivial; that is, all water resources are depleted in the
ﬁrst period for any length of the horizon. (ii) In the optimal
solution, all users deplete their water resources in the very last
period, i:e:;ui;2 ¼ xi;2;8i
 
. Therefore, we have Ci;1ð~u1;~x1Þ ¼
½gi;1ðui;1; xi;1Þ þ bgi;2ðxi;2; xi;2Þ. Furthermore, xi,2 is a function of ~u1;
and, hence, the n  user problem given in (3)–(5) reduces to a
single period problem which is only a function of ~u1 and ~x1.
We can use these implications to obtain below a tighter
formulation of the original problem and to establish additional
properties.
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(i) Ci;1ð~u1;~x1Þ is strictly increasing in ui,1 at ui,1 = 0 if qi,1ai,1P
b(qi,2ai,2 + ci,2w1), i = 1, . . . ,n.
(ii) Ci;1ð~u1;~x1Þ is continuous and jointly concave in ~u1 if and only if
ci,2 6 qi,2bi,2, i = 1, . . . ,n.The ﬁrst part of the above result establishes the positivity of the
optimal solution, that is ui;1 > 0 for all i, i = 1, . . . ,n. Therefore, it suf-
ﬁces for our setting to consider a tighter search space (0 < ui,1 6 x1
"i). The latter part guarantees a well-behaving objective function
for optimization. We can now re-state the two-period decentral-
ized problem as follows. For i = 1, . . . ,n,
max
ui;1
Ci;1ð~u1;~x1Þ ¼ max
ui;1
½gi;1ðui;1; xi;1Þ þ bgi;2ðxi;2; xi;2Þ; ð6Þ
s:t: 0 < ui;1 6 x1; ð7Þ
where the water stock in the last period xi,2 is given by Eq. (4).
We note that the problem stated in Eqs. (4), (6) and (7) corre-
sponds to a single period strategic form game given by the payoff
function Ci;1ð~u1;~x1Þ and the strategy set ui,1. We observe that the
strategy set; 0 < ui,1 6 x1, is nonempty, continuous, convex and
compact (closed and bounded) and that the payoff function is con-
tinuous and jointly concave in the players’ strategies as implied by
Proposition 1. Then, from Theorem 1 in Dasgubta and Maskin [5],
we have the following result.
Proposition 2 (Existence of Nash equilibrium). The n  player
game which corresponds to the decentralized problem in the strip
conﬁguration has (at least one) Nash equilibrium.
ANashequilibriumcorresponds to the simultaneous solutionofn
constrained optimization problems given above. If the Nash
equilibrium occurs such that no user depletes his initial water stock
in the ﬁrst period ui;1 < x1;8i
 
, then we have the unconstrained
solution. Although it cannot be guaranteed in general, this result ap-
pears to us as themost common, real-life solution.Moreover, we are
able to obtain further structural results and elegant solutions for the
unconstrained optimization problem, which we shall present
shortly. For completeness, we need also to consider the case of
constrained solutions where ui;1 ¼ x1. To this end, we construct the
Lagrange function Lðui;1; diÞ ¼ Ci;1ð~u1;~x1Þ þ diðx1  ui;1Þ, where
diP 0 is the Lagrange multiplier corresponding to the constraint
ui,1 6 x1. Let ~u1 ¼ u1;1; . . . ;un;1
 T
be the vector of optimal water
usage in period 1,~d ¼ d1; . . . ; dn
 T be the optimal vector of the La-
grange multipliers, ~x1 ¼ ðx1; . . . ; x1ÞT be an n  1 vector of initial
water stock in period 1 and ~0 ¼ ð0; . . . ;0ÞT be an n  1 zero vector.
Then, as shown in the Online Supplement for Proposition 3, the Kar-
ush–Kuhn–
Tucker (KKT) conditions of the Lagrange function give the following.
A~u1 ~dT ¼ W; ð8Þ
~dTð~x1 ~u1Þ ¼ 0; ð9Þ
~u1 6~x1; ð10Þ
~d P~0; ð11Þ
where Ann ¼
c1 r1 0 0    0
1 c2 r2 0    0
0 2 c3 r3    0
..
. ..
. ..
. ..
. ..
. ..
.
0 0    n2 cn1 rn1
0 0    0 n1 cn
0BBBBBBB@
1CCCCCCCA; Wn1 ¼
ðk1 k2    kn1 knÞT andci ¼
bð1 aÞ2ðci;2  qi;2bi;2Þ  ðqi;1bi;1 þ ci;1Þ; i ¼ 1;n;
bð1 2aÞ2ðci;2  qi;2bi;2Þ  ðqi;1bi;1 þ ci;1Þ; o:w:
(
ki ¼
bð1 aÞ½qi;2ðai;2  bi;2x1Þ þ ðci;2  qi;2bi;2Þw1  qi;1ai;1;
i ¼ 1;n;
bð1 2aÞ½qi;2ðai;2  bi;2x1Þ þ ðci;2  qi;2bi;2Þw1  qi;1ai;1;
o:w:
8>><>>:
ri ¼
bað1aÞðci;2qi;2bi;2Þ; i¼1;
bað12aÞðci;2qi;2bi;2Þ; o:w:
(
and i ¼
bað1aÞðcn;2qn;2bn;2Þ; i¼n1;
bað12aÞðci;2qi;2bi;2Þ; o:w:
(
Proposition 1 implies that the Hessian of Ci,1 is negative semi-def-
inite, and, hence, the two-period decentralized problem is a concave
quadratic program. Therefore, the KKT conditions in (8)–(11) are, in
fact, sufﬁcient for~u1 to be a global optimal solution as mentioned in
Nocedal and Wright [12]. Several classes of algorithms have been
used for solving concave quadratic problems that contain both
inequality and equality constraints. Active-set methods have for
long been used and are proved to be effective for small- and med-
ium-sized problems. However, a special type of active-set methods
called the gradient projection method has recently been shown
most effective for solving concave quadratic problems having only
upper and lower bounds as constraints on the decision variables,
as discussed in Nocedal and Wright [12]. Hence, any one of these
methods may be employed for solving the KKT conditions above
since we have only the upper bound on decision variables. Clearly,
if di ¼ 0 in the solution for the above Lagrange function for all i,
then, the optimal solution is the unconstrained solution (global
maximizer of Ci;1ð~u1;~x1Þ in Rþ), which we consider next. First, we
establish the uniqueness of the unconstrained optimal solution.
Proposition 3. Uniqueness of the global maximizer and opt imal
ity).
(i) The global maximizer of Ci;1ð~u1;~x1Þ is unique and given by
u1;1 ¼ s1j ;u2;1 ¼ s2j and ukþ2;1 ¼ k^kþ2 þ e^ðkþ2;1Þu1;1 þ e^ðkþ2;2Þu2;1,
for k = 1, . . . ,n  2, wheres1 ¼ k1
P1
j¼0eðn;njÞe^ðnj;2Þ
h i
 r1 kn½P1
j¼0eðn;njÞk^nj;s2¼ c1 kn
P1
j¼0eðn;njÞk^nj
h i
 k1
P1
j¼0eðn;njÞ
h
e^ðnj;1Þ;j¼c1
P1
j¼0eðn;njÞe^ðnj;2Þ
h i
r1
P1
j¼0eðn;njÞe^ðnj;1Þ
h i
;k^kþ2¼
kkþ1 
P2
j¼1eðkþ1;kþ2jÞk^kþ2j
h i
=½eðkþ1;kþ2Þ; e^ðkþ2;mÞ ¼ 
P2
j¼1
h
eðkþ1;kþ2jÞe^ðkþ2j;mÞ=½eðkþ1;kþ2Þ, for m ¼ 1;2; k^1 ¼ k^2 ¼ 0; e^ð1;1Þ ¼
e^ð2;2Þ ¼ 1; e^ð1;2Þ ¼ e^ð2;1Þ ¼ 0 and eðm;iÞ ¼ e^ðm;1Þ ¼ e^ðm;2Þ ¼ 0, for
{i,m} < 1 and {i,m} > n; for i = 1, . . . ,n,e(i,i) = ci and
eði;jÞ ¼
ri; ði; jÞ ¼ ði; iþ 1Þ; i ¼ 1; . . . ;n 1
i; ði; jÞ ¼ ði; i 1Þ; i ¼ 2; . . . ;n
0; o:w:
8<: .
(ii) If 0 6 ui;1 6 x1, for all i, then ui;1, given above, is the optimal
solution for the decentralized problem.
When all users are identical, we have gi,t = gt for all i. In the se-
quel, in A and W, we have
ci ¼
c; i ¼ 1;n
; o:w:

; ri ¼
x; i ¼ 1
r; o:w:

;
i ¼
x; i ¼ n 1
r; o:w:

and ki ¼
g; i ¼ 1;n
k; o:w:

;
where c = b(1  a)2(c2  q2b2)  (q1b1 + c1),  = b(1  2a)2(c2 
q2b2)  (q1b1 + c1), x = ba(1  a)(c2  q2b2), r = ba(1  2a)(c2 
q2b2), g = b(1  a)[q2(a2  b2x1) + (c2 + q2b2)w1]  q1a1 and
248 Y. Saleh et al. / European Journal of Operational Research 215 (2011) 244–256k = b(1  2a)[q2(a2  b2x1) + (c2  q2b2)w1]  q1a1. In this case, the
system can be characterized through difference equations with
location index as the argument (see Elaydi [6]); hence, we have a
closed form result for the optimal solution to the unconstrained
problem.
Corollary 2 (Unique global maximizer for identical users). For
n  identical users on a strip, let k = n/2 if n is even and (n + 1)/2
otherwise. Then, the system A~u1 ¼ W has a unique solution given by
ui;1 ¼ uniþ1;1 ¼ h0 þ h1ðr1Þi þ h2ðr2Þi; i ¼ 1; . . . ; k, where h0 = k/
(2r + ), r1 ¼ ð
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
2  4r2
p
Þ=2r, r2 ¼ ðþ
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
2  4r2
p
Þ=2r and
for k = n/2,
h1 ¼
g cþx2rþ
 
k
h i
½cr1 þxðr1Þ2  ½cr2 þxðr2Þ2 rþðrþÞr1rþðrþÞr2
h i
r1
r2
 ðk1Þ ;
h2 ¼ h1 rþ ðrþ Þr1rþ ðrþ Þr2
 	
r1
r2

 ðk1Þ
and for k = (n + 1)/2,
h1 ¼
g cþx2rþ
 
k
h i
½cr1 þxðr1Þ2  ½cr2 þxðr2Þ2 2rþr12rþr2
h i
r1
r2
 ðk1Þ ;
h2 ¼ h1 2rþ r12rþ r2
 	
r1
r2

 ðk1Þ
:Remarks. (1). We note Saak and Peterson [14] ﬁnd that the Nash
equilibrium for n = 2 giveswater usages for both users that are sym-
metric, unique and dependent on lateral ﬂow coefﬁcient a. Corollary
2 also implies that the unconstrained optimal solution is symmetric
around themid-point (s) of the strip andgeneralizes their ﬁndings to
the casewheren > 2. (2). Since  andr are negative,wehave r1, r2 < 0
and r1 > r2. This implies that the unconstrained optimal solution has
a ﬂuctuating structure across the users from the extremes toward
the center. Thus, for the unconstrained optimal solution, we have
established theoretically Saak and Peterson’s [14] conjecture (p.
226) that water usage would not be monotone for multiple users
(n > 2) evenwhen they are all identical.We think that this has signif-
icance for policy makers in the design of payment schemes (cost
structures) for underground water usage for multiple users (n > 2).
In our numerical study, we have observed that, typically, the second
most extreme users at both ends of the strip have the highest water
consumption in the unconstrained solutions. If this observation
always holds, then it may be possible to obtain the cost-revenue
parameter space so that the Nash equilibrium always occurs as the
unconstrainedoptimal. (3). In the above formulation of the problem,
we have assumed that users have complete information about other
players’ parameters and the hydrological properties of the aquifer
expressed througha. An interesting variant of the problemanalyzed
by Saak and Peterson [14] for n = 2 is the case where users have
incomplete information about a considered to be a random variable.
In the case of identical users, it turns out that, also forn > 2, the prob-
lem can be stated as the expected total discounted proﬁts and all of
the results provided so far involving awould still hold in the expec-
tation sense; that is, E[a] in place of a, E[(1  a)2] in place of (1  a)2
etc. For non-identical users, incorporation of asymmetry of informa-
tion seems not so straightforward.We examine further properties of
the optimal solutions in our numerical study.3.2. The centralized problem
In this problem, we envision a central decision maker (social
planner in the public policy parlance) aiming at determining theoptimal water usage for each user so that the total joint discounted
proﬁt of all users throughout the planning horizon of two periods is
maximized. The problem can be formally stated as a dynamic pro-
gramming problem as follows. For t = 1, 2, and i = 1, . . . ,n,eCt ð~ut;~xtÞ ¼ maxui;t ;...;un;t eCtð~ut ;~xtÞ
¼ max
ui;t ;...;un;t
Xn
i¼1
gi;tðui;t ; xi;tÞ
( )
þ bt eCtþ1ð~utþ1;~xtþ1Þ
( )
ð12Þ
s:t: ð4Þ and ð7Þ
where eCtð~ut ;~xtÞ is the joint proﬁt-to-go function from period t until
the end of the problem horizon. All of the other conventions and
notations of the decentralized problem are retained. SinceeCtð~ut;~xtÞ is a positive linear combination of individual discounted
proﬁt-to-go functions in the decentralized problem, we immedi-
ately have the following.
Corollary 3. Myopic optimality, positivity, continuity, concavity
(i) The myopically optimal water usage in period t is to deplete all
stock gi;tðui;t ; xi;tÞ ¼ gi;tðxi;t ; xi;tÞ
h i
.
(ii) For a given~x1; eC1ð~u1;~x1Þ is strictly increasing in ui,1 at ui,1 = 0 if
qi,1ai,1P b(qi,2ai,2 + ci,2w1), for all i.
(iii) For a given~x1; eC1ð~u1;~x1Þ is continuous and jointly concave in~u1
if and only if ci,2 6 qi,2bi,2, for all i.
The above imply that the centralized problem also reduces to an
equivalent single period concave quadratic optimization problem
subject to the constraint set 0 < ui,1 6 x1, for all i. Constructing
the Lagrange function for this problem Lðui;1; diÞ ¼ eCið~ut ;~xtÞþ
diðx1  ui;1Þ, the KKT conditions result in eA~u1 ~dT ¼ fW , together
with (9)–(11). The unconstrained solution of the centralized
problem corresponding to the general case of non-identical users
is given in the following result.
Proposition 4. Uniqueness of the global maximizer and
optimality).
(i) The global maximizer of eC1ð~u1;~x1Þ is unique and given by
u1;1 ¼
~k1
~x ;u

2;1 ¼
~k2
~x and u

kþ2;1 ¼ h^kþ2 þ e^ðkþ2;1Þu1;1 þ e^ðkþ2;2Þu2;1,
for k = 1, . . . ,n  2, where~k1 ¼
X2
j¼0
eðn;njÞe^ðnj;2Þ hn1 
X3
j¼0
eðn1;njÞh^nj
" #

X3
j¼0
eðn1;njÞe^ðnj;2Þ½hn 
X2
j¼0
eðn;njÞh^nj;
~k2 ¼
X3
j¼0
eðn1;njÞe^ðnj;1Þ½hn 
X2
j¼0
eðn;njÞh^nj

X2
j¼0
eðn;njÞe^ðnj;1Þ hn1 
X3
j¼0
eðn1;njÞh^nj
" #
;
~x ¼
X3
j¼0
eðn1;njÞe^ðnj;1Þ
X2
j¼0
eðn;njÞe^ðnj;2Þ

X3
j¼0
eðn1;njÞe^ðnj;2Þ
X2
j¼0
eðn;njÞe^ðnj;1Þ;
h^kþ2 ¼ hk 
X4
j¼1
eðk;kþ2jÞh^kþ2j
" #,
½eðk;kþ2Þ;
e^ðkþ2;mÞ ¼ 
X4
j¼1
eðk;kþ2jÞe^ðkþ2j;mÞ
" #,
½eðk;kþ2Þ;
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eðm;iÞ ¼ e^ðm;1Þ ¼ e^ðm;2Þ ¼ 0, for {m, i} < 1 and {m,ti} > n; e(i,i) ;= (qi,1-
qi,1bi,1 + ci,1) + b(1  a)2(qi,2bi, 2  ci,2) + ba2(qj,2bj,2  cj,2), (i, j) 2
{(1,2), (n,n  1)},eði;iÞ ¼ ðqi;1bi;1þ ci;1Þþbð12aÞ2ðqi;2bi;2 ci;2Þ
þba2½ðqi1;2bi1;2 ci1;2Þþ ðqiþ1;2biþ1;2 ciþ1;2Þ;
i¼ 2; . . . ;n1;
eði;mÞ ¼ ba2ðqj;2bj;2 cj;2Þ; ði; j;mÞ 2 fð1;2;3Þ;
ðn;n1;n2Þ;ð2;3;4Þ;ðn1;n2;n3Þ;
ðk;k1;k2Þ; ðk;kþ1;kþ2Þg;
eði;jÞ ¼ bað1aÞðqi;2bi;2 ci;2Þþbað12aÞðqj;2bj;2 cj;2Þ;
ði; jÞ 2 fð1;2Þ;ðn;n1Þg;
eði;jÞ ¼ bað12aÞðqi;2bi;2 ci;2Þþbað1aÞ
 ðqj;2bj;2 cj;2Þ;ði; jÞ 2 fð2;1Þ;ðn1;nÞg;
eði;jÞ ¼ bað12aÞ½ðqi;2bi;2 ci;2Þþ ðqj;2bj;2 cj;2Þ;
ði; jÞ 2 fð2;3Þ;ðn1;n2Þ;ðk;k1Þ; ðk;kþ1Þg;
eði;jÞ ¼ 0; elsewhere;
hi ¼qi;1ai;1bð1aÞðqi;2ai;2þ ci;2w1Þbaðqj;2aj;2þ cj;2w1Þ
þbð1aÞqi;2bi;2ðx1þw1Þþbaqj;2bj;2ðx1þw1Þ;
ði; jÞ 2 fð1;2Þ; ðn;n1Þg and
hi ¼qi;1ai;1bð12aÞðqi;2ai;2þ ci;2w1Þba½ðqi1;2ai1;2þ ci1;2w1Þ
þ ðqiþ1;2aiþ1;2þ ciþ1;2w1Þþbð12aÞqi;2bi;2ðx1þw1Þ
þba½qi1;2bi1;2ðx1þw1Þþqiþ1;2biþ1;2ðx1þw1Þ;
i¼ 2; . . . ;n1:(ii) If 0 6 ui;1 6 x1, for all i, then ui;1, given above, is the optimal
solution for the centralized problem.
For identical users, we establish that the global maximizer of eC1
in Rþ is unique, independent of the hydrological properties of the
aquifer (a) and it is the same for all users unlike the decentralized
solution. Furthermore, the unconstrained solution is the optimal
for the centralized problem for certain cost and revenue parameter
values. We state this result below.
Corollary 4. Uniqueness of the global maximizer and optimality
for identical users).
(i) Suppose that users are identical and c2 6 q2b2. Then, the global
maximizer of eC1ð~u1;~x1Þ is unique and given by
ui;1 ¼ u
¼ ½q1a1  bðq2a2 þ c2w1Þ þ bq2b2ðx1 þw1Þ=½ðq1b1 þ c1Þ
þ bðq2b2  c2Þ; 8i:(ii) If 0 6 ui;1 6 x1, for all i, then the optimal solution for the cen-
tralized problem is given by u⁄⁄ above.Remarks (1). Saak and Peterson [14] have shown for n = 2 that the
optimal solution is independent of the characteristics of the aquifer
expressed through a. Hence, Corollary 4 generalizes this ﬁnding.
However, Saak and Peterson [14] make an implicit assumption that
the Nash equilibrium will be the unconstrained solution through-
out their analysis. In our result, we establish the conditions for
the optimality of the global maximizer to be within the constraint
set. (2). The conditions for the optimal solution above imply that,
under the cost-revenue assumptions of Saak and Peterson [14],
the centralized problem results in an optimal usage which does
not deplete the initial stock when 0.5 6 b 6 1 - giving a realistic
hurdle rate between 0% and 100% per period. Hence, we think thatthe above optimal result would be observed in most realistic cases.
(3). From a policy maker’s perspective, it is important to know if
the centralized solution can be achieved in the decentralized
game- theoretic setting through a pricing mechanism. Under the
stated condition above, the optimal solution dictates the same
usage for all users. However, in the decentralized solution for the
unconstrained case, we established that water usage ﬂuctuates
from the ends toward themidpoint (s) of the strip. As these consti-
tute instances of counter examples, we establish by contradiction
the following.Corollary 5. No coordination). In a strip conﬁgura-
tion with n identical users, for (qtbt + ct)x0 < qtat < (2qtbt + ct)x0, there
does not exist a periodic unit pumping cost ct that equates the Nash
equilibrium with the centralized optimal solution, for all t.
We present further observations about the optimal solution in
our numerical section.4. Ring conﬁguration
In this section, we consider the setting where all n users are con-
nected to each other in a ring or circular conﬁguration. By deﬁnition
of a ring, we have n > 2. Unlike the strip conﬁguration examined
above, there are no locational extremes (ends) and each user has ex-
actly two neighbors. Hence, the lateral ﬂows in the aquifermakes all
users communicatewitheachother; and, oneparticularuser’swater
consumption affects all users in the system either directly or indi-
rectly. The more even nature of the structure brings a similar even-
ness to the solution as well, as shall be discussed below. Users are
numbered in a clockwise fashion where each user has lateral ﬂow
from one preceding and one succeeding adjacent user in the ring.
In this conﬁguration, we consider below the decentralized and cen-
tralized decision making environments.
4.1. The decentralized problem
The decentralized problem for the ring conﬁguration is similar
to that for the strip conﬁguration except that the recursive relation
between water stocks over time is different owing to the non-exis-
tence of any ends of a ring. For t = 1, 2, the decentralized problem
for user i, i = 1, . . . ,n, is formally stated as a dynamic program given
by
Ci;tð~ut;~xtÞ ¼ maxui;t Ci;tð
~ut ;~xtÞ
¼ max
ui;t
gi;tðui;t ; xi;tÞ þ bi;tCi;tþ1ð~utþ1;~xtþ1Þ
h i
; ð13Þ
s:t: xi;tþ1 ¼
xi;t þwi;t  ð1 2aÞui;t  aðuj;t þ um;tÞ;
ði; j;mÞ 2 fð1;n;2Þ; ðn;n 1;1Þg;
xi;t þwi;t  ð1 2aÞui;t  aðui1;t þ uiþ1;tÞ;
i ¼ 2; . . . ;n 1;
8>><>>: ð14Þ
0 6 ui;t 6 xi;t : ð15Þ
In the above, we retain the previous notations. Note that Eq. (14)
describes the recursive temporal relationship among the water
stocks of the users under Darcy’s Law; unlike the strip, the ring con-
ﬁguration allows for each user to communicate with its immediate
neighbors. As before, we have the same a for all users and all t;
bi,t = b with 0 6 b 6 1; we set xi,1 = x1, wi,1 = w1 and C3ð~u3;~x3Þ  0
for all ~x3, ~u3 and for i = 1, . . . ,n. (We later relax the condition on
C3ð~u3;~x3Þ). The properties of the within period proﬁt function in
Corollary 1 also imply that the decentralized problem in the ring
conﬁguration can be written as a single period problem, and that
its objective function is also a well-behaving function as stated in
the following result.
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(i) Ci;1ð~u1;~x1Þð¼ ½gi;1ðui;1; xi;1Þ þ bgi;2ðxi;2; xi;2ÞÞ is strictly increas-
ing in ui,1 at ui,1 = 0 if qi,1ai,1P b(qi,2ai,2 + ci,2w1), i = 1, . . . ,n.
(ii) Ci;1ð~u1;~x1Þ is continuous and jointly concave in~u1 if and only if
ci,2 6 qi,2bi,2, i = 1, . . . ,n.
The proof methodology is identical to that for Proposition 1 and,
hence, is omitted. Proposition 5 enables a tighter reformulation of
the n  user problem given by Eq. (6) as the objective function sub-
ject to Eq. (7) where the water stock in the last period xi,2 is given by
Eq. (14). As the properties of the problem satisfy those of Theorem 1
inDasgubta andMaskin [5], we have the existence of aNash equilib-
rium as stated below.
Proposition 6. Existence of Nash equilibrium The n  player game
which corresponds to the decentralized problem in the ring conﬁgu-
ration has (at least one) Nash equilibrium.
The Nash equilibrium corresponds to the simultaneous solution
of n constrained optimization problems with a single constraint
ui,1 6 x1, i = 1, . . . ,n. As shown in the Online Supplement for
Proposition 7, the KKT conditions of the Lagrange function
Lðui;1; diÞ ¼ Cið~u1;~x1Þ þ diðx1  ui;1Þ, together with (9)–(11), give
B~u1 ~dT ¼ Z, where
Bnn ¼
1 r1 0 0    r1
r2 2 r2 0    0
0 r3 3 r3    0
..
. ..
. ..
. ..
. ..
. ..
.
0 0    rn1 n1 rn1
rn 0    0 rn n
0BBBBBBBBB@
1CCCCCCCCCA
; Zn1 ¼ ðk1k2   kn1knÞT
and
i ¼ bð1 2aÞ2ðci;2  qi;2bi;2Þ  ðqi;1bi;1 þ ci;1Þ;ri
¼ bað1 2aÞðci;2  qi;2bi;2Þ and ki
¼ bð1 2aÞ½qi;2ðai;2  bi;2x1Þ þ ðci;2  qi;2bi;2Þw1  qi;1ai;1:
Proposition 5 implies that the Hessian matrix of Ci,1 is negative
semi-deﬁnite, and, hence, the problem is a concave quadratic pro-
gram. Therefore, the KKT conditions above are, again, sufﬁcient
for ~u1 to be a global optimal solution; and, the above mentioned
methods may be used to ﬁnd it. Next, we focus on the uncon-
strained solution di ¼ 0;8i
 
.
Proposition 7. Uniqueness of the global maximizer and optimality
for non-identical users).
(i) Suppose that users are non-identical. Then, the global maxi-
mizer of Ci;1ð~u1;~x1Þ is unique and given by u1;1 ¼ ~s1~j ;u2;1 ¼
~s2
~j
and ukþ2;1 ¼ k^kþ2 þ e^ðkþ2;1Þu1;1 þ e^ðkþ2;2Þu2;1, for k = 1, . . . ,n  2,
where~s1 ¼ ½k1r1k^n
X1
j¼0
eðn;njÞe^ðnj;2Þ
" #
½r1þr1 e^ðn;2Þ kn
X1
j¼0
eðn;njÞk^nj
" #
;
~s2 ¼ ½1þr1 e^ðn;1Þ kn
X1
j¼0
eðn;njÞ k^nj
" #
½k1r1k^n rnþ
X1
j¼0
eðn;njÞe^ðnj;1Þ
" #
;~j¼ ½1þr1 e^ðn;1Þ
X1
j¼0
eðn;njÞe^ðnj;2Þ
" #
½r1þr1 e^ðn;2Þ rnþ
X1
j¼0
eðn;njÞ e^ðnj;1Þ
" #
; k^kþ2and e^ðkþ2;mÞ are as deﬁned before in Proposition 3. In addition, we have,
for i = 1, . . . ,n, e(i,i) = i andeði;jÞ ¼
ri; ði; jÞ 2 fði; iþ 1Þ; ð1;nÞg; i ¼ 1; . . . ;n 1;
ri; ði; jÞ 2 fði; i 1Þ; ðn;1Þg; i ¼ 2; . . . ;n;
0; o:w:
8><>: :
(ii) If 0 6 ui;1 6 x1, for all i, then ui;1, given above, is the optimal
solution for the decentralized problem.
When all users are identical (i.e. i = ,ri = r and ki = k, where ,
r, k < 0), it is possible to obtain a compact expression for the Nash
equilibrium.
Corollary 6. Unique Nash equilibrium for identical users). The
n  player game corresponding to the decentralized problem in a ring
conﬁguration has a unique Nash equilibrium given by, for all i,
ui;1 ¼
k=ð2rþ Þ; k > ð2rþ Þx1;
x1; o:w:
Remarks(1). In a ring conﬁguration with identical users, all users
consume the same amount from the aquifer in each period. So long
as the cost-revenue structure is such that the condition k >
(2r + )x1 is satisﬁed, the water stock is not depleted; otherwise,
all users deplete the initial stock in the ﬁrst period leaving nothing
for the next period. We think that this observation may have signif-
icant implications for policy makers in setting the unit costs for
underground water usage if decentralized decision making is to
be employed. (2). Since users’ optimal decisions are identical, it
may be possible to convince the users either (i) into a cooperative
game rather than the competitive one they are playing, or (ii) into
enforcing a centralized decision. In the next section, we take up
this important issue of possible coordination through unit prices;
that is, whether or not single price mechanisms exist through
which the decentralized solution may converge to the centralized
optimal decision. (3). Similar to the strip conﬁguration, it is possi-
ble to construct the above game with imperfect information about
the parameter a by replacing the expressions involving awith their
expectation for identical users.4.2. The centralized problem
Analogous to the strip conﬁguration, the centralized problem
for the ring conﬁguration envisions that a social planner aims at
determining the optimal underground water usage for each user
so as to maximize the total discounted proﬁt for the entire system
stated in Eq. (12) subject to Eq. (15) where xi,2 is characterized by
Eq. (14). Since the objective function of the optimization is a posi-
tive linear combination of the individual proﬁt-to-go functions, we
have the following result.
Corollary 7. Myopic optimality, positivity, continuity, concavity
(i) The myopically optimal water usage in period t is to deplete all
stock gi;tðui;t ; xi;tÞ ¼ gi;tðxi;t ; xi;tÞ
h i
.
(ii) For a given~x1; eC1ð~u1;~x1Þ is strictly increasing in ui,1 at ui,1 = 0 if
qi,1ai,1P b(qi,2ai,2 + ci,2w1), for all i.
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if and only if ci,2 6 qi,2bi,2, for all i.
The above result once again implies that the centralized prob-
lem in the ring conﬁguration reduces to an equivalent single per-
iod concave quadratic optimization problem subject to the initial
constraint set ui,1 6 x1 for all i. Constructing the Lagrange function
for this problem in a similar fashion, we observe that the KKT
conditions are given by eB~u1 ~dT ¼ fW , together with (9)–(11).
Similar to the strip conﬁguration, the method of ﬁnding the
unconstrained solution for the general case of non-identical users
is given below.
Proposition 8. Uniqueness of the global maximizer and optimality
for non-identical users).
(i) Suppose that users are non-identical. Then, the global maxi-
mizer of eC1ð~u1;~x1Þ is unique and given by u1;1 ¼ ~c1~r , u2;1 ¼ ~c2~r ,
u3;1 ¼
~2~d2;1u1;1~d2;2u2;1
~d2;3
, u4;1 ¼
1d1;1u1;1d1;2u2;1d1;3u3;1
d1;4
andukþ2;1 ¼
/^kþ2 þ e^ðkþ2;1Þu1;1 þ e^ðkþ2;2Þu2;1 þ e^ðkþ2;3Þu3;1 þ e^ðkþ2;4Þu4;1, for
k = 3, . . . ,n  2, where~c1 ¼ ð~d2;3~3  ~d3;3~2Þð~d4;2~d2;3  ~d4;3~d2;2Þ
 ð~d2;3~4  ~d4;3~2Þð~d3;2~d2;3  ~d3;3~d2;2Þ;
~c2 ¼ ð~d2;3~4  ~d4;3~2Þð~d3;1~d2;3  ~d3;3~d2;1Þ
 ð~d2;3~3  ~d3;3~2Þð~d4;1~d2;3  ~d4;3~d2;1Þ;
~r ¼ ð~d3;1~d2;3  ~d3;3~d2;1Þð~d4;2~d2;3  ~d4;3~d2;2Þ
 ð~d3;2~d2;3  ~d3;3~d2;2Þð~d4;1~d2;3  ~d4;3~d2;1Þ;
~i ¼ d1;ii  di;41; ~di;j ¼ d1;4di;j  di;4d1;j;
for i ¼ 2;3;4 and j ¼ 1;2;3;
d1;m ¼
eð1;mÞ þ
P1
j¼0
eð1;njÞe^ðnj;mÞ; m ¼ 1;2;3
P1
j¼0
eð1;njÞe^ðnj;4Þ; m ¼ 4
8>>><>>: ;
d2;m ¼ eð2;mÞ þ eð2;nÞe^ðn;mÞ; m ¼ 1;2;3;4;
d3;m ¼
eðn1;1Þ þ
P3
j¼0
eðn1;njÞe^ðnj;1Þ; m ¼ 1
P3
j¼0
eðn1;njÞe^ðnj;mÞ; m ¼ 2;3;4
8>><>>>: ;
d4;m ¼
eðn;mÞ þ
P2
j¼0
eðn;njÞe^ðnj;mÞ; m ¼ 1;2
P2
j¼0
eðn;njÞe^ðnj;mÞ; m ¼ 3;4
8>><>>>:
1 ¼ /1 
X1
j¼0
eð1;njÞ/^nj;
2 ¼ /2  eð2;nÞ/^n;
3 ¼ /n1 
X3
j¼0
eðn1;njÞ/^nj;
4 ¼ /n 
X3
j¼0
eðn;njÞ/^nj;with/^kþ2 ¼ /k 
P4
j¼1eðk;kþ2jÞ/^kþ2j
h i
=½eðk;kþ2Þ, e^ðkþ2;mÞ ¼ 
P4
j¼1
h
eðk;kþ2jÞe^ðkþ2j;mÞ=½eðk;kþ2Þ, for m = 1,2,3,4, with the conventions
/^j ¼ 0; e^ðj;jÞ ¼ 1, for j ¼ 1;2;3;4; e^ði;jÞ ¼ 0, for i,j = 1,2,3,4,i– j, and
eðm;iÞ ¼ e^ðm;jÞ ¼ 0, for {i,m} < 1 and {i,m} > n and j = 1, 2, 3, 4, where,
for i = 1, . . . ,n, e(i,i) = (qi,1bi,1 + ci,1) + b(1  2a)2(qi, 2bi,2  ci,2) +
ba2[(qi1,2bi1,2  ci1,2) + (qi+1,2bi+1, 2  ci+1,2)], e(i,i2) =ba2
(qi1,2bi1,2  ci1,2), e(i,i1) = ba(1  2a)[(qi1,2bi1,2  ci1, 2) +
(qi,2bi,2  ci,2)], e(i,i+1) = ba(1  2a)[(qi,2bi,2  ci, 2) + (qi+1,2bi+1,2 
ci+1,2)], e(i,i+2) = ba2(qi+1,2bi+1,2  ci+1,2),e(i,j) = 0, elsewhere and
/i = qi,1ai,1  b[a(qi1,2ai1,2 + ci1, 2w1) + (1  2a)(qi,2ai,2 + ci,2w1) +
a(qi+1,2ai+1,2 + ci+1,2w1)] + b[aqi1,2bi1,2(x1 + w1) + (1  2a)
qi, 2bi,2(x1 + w1) + aqi+1,2bi+1,2(x1 + w1)].
(ii) If 0 6 ui;1 6 x1, for all i, then ui;1, given above, is the optimal
solution for the centralized problem.
For identical users, we ﬁnd that the results for the optimal solu-
tion of the centralized ring conﬁguration are exactly the same as
those for the strip conﬁguration, as stated below.
Corollary 8 (Uniqueness of the global maximizer and optimality
for identical users). Identical to the results of Corollary 4.
Corollaries 4 and 8 indicate that the conﬁguration of the users
does not change the optimal allocation of water among users when
the system is managed centrally. In the strip conﬁguration, we
have shown that it is not possible to coordinate the system through
a centrally set unit cost (ct). This arises from decentralized deci-
sions of users being non-identical even for identical users due to
their differing locations over the common aquifer. For the ring con-
ﬁguration, the decentralized optimal solution is the same for all
identical users. The next question we will address is: Is it possible
to coordinate the system in the ring conﬁguration?
Corollary 9 (No coordination). In a ring conﬁguration with n
identical users, for (qtbt + ct)x0 < qtat < (2qtbt + ct)x0, there does not
exist a periodic unit pumping cost c2 that equates the Nash equilibrium
with the centralized optimal solution, for all t.
Thus, under the cost structure adopted herein and by Saak and
Peterson [14], the social planner can not entice multiple (n > 2)
users to behave in accordance with the centralized optimal deci-
sion. If the total proﬁts realized from the central allocation of usage
are greater than those realized decentrally, then the centralized
solution will dominate the decentralized one. Unfortunately, no
analytical comparison could be obtained for the total discounted
proﬁts realized from the optimal usage quantities under both man-
agement systems. However, the following section provides some
numerical illustrations and comparisons between the solutions in
both conﬁgurations.
So far, we have considered the scenario where all water stock is
depleted by the end of the problem horizon. Next, we extend this
model by allowing users to partially consume water stock for the
second period for irrigation purposes and to salvage the remaining
stocks according to a quadratic salvage value function. The addi-
tion of a salvage function may be viewed as a proxy for the impact
of extending the problem horizon. We discuss this variant of the
model in the Appendix; we observe that the fundamental results
hold under certain conditions for this case, as well.5. Illustrative examples
We next present some numerical examples to illustrate the
impact of the number of users and the lateral transmissivity
Table 1
Equilibrium usage in period 1 for n  identical users on a strip.
n 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Setting1 qi,t = 1, ai,t = 10, bi,t = 5, ci,t = 2
u1;1 .5 .6757 .6631 .6635 .6635 .6635 .6635 .6635 .6635 .6635
u2;1 – .6757 .8961 .8890 .8892 .8892 .8892 .8892 .8892 .8892
u3;1 – – .6631 .8890 .8819 .8821 .8821 .8821 .8821 .8821
u4;1 – – – .6635 .8892 .8821 .8824 .8824 .8824 .8824
u5;1 – – – – .6635 .8892 .8821 .8824 .8824 .8824
u6;1 – – – – – .6635 .8892 .8821 .8824 .8824
u7;1 – – – – – – .6635 .8892 .8821 .8824
u8;1 – – – – – – – .6635 .8892 .8821
u9;1 – – – – – – – – .6635 .8892
u10;1 – – – – – – – – – .6635eC1ð~u1;~x1Þ 7.83 15.66 23.49 31.32 39.15 46.98 54.81 62.64 70.47 78.30Pn
i¼1C

i;1ð~u1;~x1Þ 7.83 15.20 22.26 29.28 36.08 43.12 50.14 57.16 64.18 71.20
Setting2 qi,1 = 1.05, qi,2 = 1, ai,t = 10, bi,t = 5, ci,t = 2
u1;1 .5366 .7105 .6985 .6988 .6988 .6988 .6988 .6988 .6988 .6988
u2;1 – .7105 .9274 .9206 .9208 .9208 .9208 .9208 .9208 .9208
u3;1 – – .6985 .9206 .9124 .9141 .9141 .9141 .9141 .9141
u4;1 – – – .6988 .9208 .9141 .9143 .9143 .9143 .9143
u5;1 – – – – .6988 .9208 .9141 .9143 .9143 .9143
u6;1 – – – – – .6988 .9208 .9141 .9143 .9143
u7;1 – – – – – – .6988 .9208 .9141 .9143
u8;1 – – – – – – – .6988 .9208 .9141
u9;1 – – – – – – – – .6988 .9208
u10;1 – – – – – – – – – .6988eC1ð~u1;~x1Þ 7.98 15.96 23.94 31.92 39.90 47.88 55.86 63.84 71.82 79.80Pn
i¼1C

i;1ð~u1;~x1Þ 7.98 15.64 21.91 28.12 35.07 42.06 49.02 55.98 62.94 69.90
Setting3 qi,t = 1, ai,1 = 10.5, ai,2 = 10, bi,t = 5, ci,t = 2
u1;1 .55 .7297 .7168 .7172 .7172 .7172 .7172 .7172 .7172 .7172
u2;1 – .7297 .9552 .9480 .9482 .9482 .9482 .9482 .9482 .9482
u3;1 – – .7168 .9480 .9407 .9410 .9410 .9410 .9410 .9410
u4;1 – – – .7172 .9482 .9410 .9412 .9412 .9412 .9412
u5;1 – – – – .7172 .9482 .9410 .9412 .9412 .9412
u6;1 – – – – – .7172 .9482 .9410 .9412 .9412
u7;1 – – – – – – .7172 .9482 .9410 .9412
u8;1 – – – – – – – .7172 .9482 .9410
u9;1 – – – – – – – – .7172 .9482
u10;1 – – – – – – – – – .7172eC1ð~u1;~x1Þ 8.01 16.02 24.03 32.04 40.05 48.06 56.07 64.08 72.09 80.10Pn
i¼1C

i;1ð~u1;~x1Þ 8.01 15.7 23 30 37.49 44.73 51.96 59.21 66.46 73.71
Table 2
Total equilibrium usage and total proﬁts for n  identical users on a strip: time-invariant setting.
n 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
u1;1 þ u1;2 1 1 .9418 .9436 .9436 .9436 .9436 .9436 .9436 .9436
u2;1 þ u2;2 – 1 1.1165 1.0564 1.0564 1.0582 1.0582 1.0582 1.0582 1.0582
u3;1 þ u3;2 – – .9418 1.0564 .9928 .9982 .9981 .9981 .9981 .9981
u4;1 þ u4;2 – – – .9436 1.0564 .9982 1.0002 1.0002 1.0002 1.0002
u5;1 þ u5;2 – – – – .9436 1.0582 .9982 1.0002 1.0002 1.0002
u6;1 þ u6;2 – – – – – .9436 1.0582 .9981 1.0002 1.0002
u7;1 þ u7;2 – – – – – – .9436 1.0582 .9981 1.0002
u8;1 þ u8;2 – – – – – – – .9436 1.0582 .9981
u9;1 þ u9;2 – – – – – – – – .9436 1.0582
u10;1 þ u10;2 – – – – – – – – – .9436
TP1 .5 1.351 2.223 3.105 3.994 4.870 5.752 6.634 7.516 8.400
R1% 50 67.57 74.08 77.62 79.75 81.16 82.17 82.93 83.52 83.99
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proﬁts. In all of the following examples, all users are taken as iden-
tical with parameters b = 1, wi,0 = wi,1 = 0 and xi,0 = xi,1 = 1. (The
numerical results are obtained from the analytical results providedabove.) For comparison with the results of Saak and Peterson [14],
we assume that a is perceived by all users to be a random variable
uniformly distributed over [0,0.5]. We provide numerical exam-
ples for time-invariant and time-variant settings.
Table 3
Proﬁts per user in the decentralized problem for n–identical users on a strip: time-invariant setting.
n 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
C1;1ð~u1;~x1Þ 7.83 7.60 7.21 7.21 7.12 7.12 7.12 7.12 7.12 7.12
C2;1ð~u1;~x1Þ – 7.60 7.83 7.42 7.42 7.44 7.44 7.44 7.44 7.44
C3;1ð~u1;~x1Þ – – 7.21 7.42 7.00 7.00 7.00 7.00 7.00 7.00
C4;1ð~u1;~x1Þ – – – 7.22 7.42 7.00 7.02 7.02 7.02 7.02
C5;1ð~u1;~x1Þ – – – – 7.12 7.44 7.00 7.02 7.02 7.02
C6;1ð~u1;~x1Þ – – – – – 7.12 7.44 7.00 7.02 7.02
C7;1ð~u1;~x1Þ – – – – – – 7.12 7.44 7.00 7.02
C8;1ð~u1;~x1Þ – – – – – – – 7.12 7.44 7.00
C9;1ð~u1;~x1Þ – – – – – – – – 7.12 7.44
C10;1ð~u1;~x1Þ – – – – – – – – – 7.12Pn
i¼1C

i;1ð~u1;~x1Þ 7.83 15.20 22.26 29.28 36.08 43.12 50.14 57.16 64.18 71.20
Table 4
Equilibrium usage in periods 1 and 2 and total proﬁts for n  identical users on a ring.
n ui;1 u

i;2 ðui;1 þ ui;2Þ TP1 R1% eC1ð~u1;~x1Þ Pni¼1Ci;1ð~u1;~x1Þ
Setting1 qi,t = 1, ai,t = 10, bi,t = 5, ci,t = 2
1 .5 .5 1 .5 50 7.83 7.83
2 .6757 .3243 1 1.3514 67.57 15.66 15.20
nP 3 .8824 .1176 1 .8824n 88.24 7.83n 7.032n
Setting2 qi,1 = 1.05, qi,2 = 1, ai,t = 10, bi,t = 5, ci,t = 2
1 .5366 .4634 1 .5366 53.66 7.98 7.98
2 .7105 .2895 1 1.421 71.05 15.96 15.64
nP 3 .9143 .0857 1 .9143n 91.43 7.98n 7.24n
Setting3 qi,t = 1, ai,1 = 10.5, ai,2 = 10, bi,t = 5, ci,t = 2
1 .55 .45 1 .55 55 8.01 8.01
2 .7297 .2703 1 1.4594 72.97 16.02 15.7
nP 3 .9411 .0589 1 .9411n 94.11 8.01n 7.25n
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on optimal water usage and expected proﬁts in the strip conﬁgu-
ration.We consider three different settings in this example. Namely,
the ﬁrst one is time-invariant inwhich,we setqi,t = 1, ai,t = 10, bi,t = 5
and ci,t = 2 for all i and t. The second setting is time-variant in which,
we setqi,1 = 1.05,qi,2 = 1, ai,t = 10, bi,t = 5 and ci,t = 2 for all i and t. The
last setting is also time variant in which, we set qi,t = 1, ai,1 = 10.5,
ai,2 = 10, bi,t = 5 and ci,t = 2 for all i and t. Table 1 summarizes the
water usage per user in period 1 accompanied with the total
discounted proﬁts in the centralized eC1  and decentralized Ci;1 
problems realized over the two-period horizon. The centralized
solution is found from Corollary 4. More speciﬁcally, for time-
invariant setting, we ﬁnd that ui;1 ¼ 0:5; i ¼ 1; . . . ;n, and the corre-
sponding discounted proﬁt is 7.83. For n users, the total discounted
proﬁt attained by the social planner is 7.83n. In the second setting,
we have ui;1 ¼ 0:5366; i ¼ 1; . . . ;n, the discounted proﬁt per user is
7.98 and the total discounted proﬁt of the social planner is 7.98n.
Likewise, in the last setting, we have ui;1 ¼ 0:55; i ¼ 1; . . . ;n, the
discounted proﬁt per user is 8.01 and total discounted proﬁt
attained by the social planner is 8.01n. We observe that with higher
crop’s unit price in period 1 (setting 2), users pumpmore in period 1
and realize more total proﬁts in the centralized problem compared
to time-invariant price (setting 1). However, as they pump more
under this setting, their total proﬁts in the decentralized problem
deteriorate with respect to the time-invariant setting. In setting 3,
we observe that users pumpmore in period 1 and realizemore total
proﬁt compared to the time-invariant setting in both centralized
and decentralized problems.
Table 2 presents the total usage per user over the two-period
planning horizon ui;1 þ ui;2
 
of the decentralized problem with
time-invariant setting. In this table, TPt denotes the total usage inperiod t where (TPt ¼
Pn
i¼1u

i;t) and Rt% denotes the percentage of
the average usage, (Rt%=(TPt/n)  100%). The optimal water usage
is symmetric around the mid-point of the strip but not monotone
with respect to the user location. This numerically validates Saak
and Peterson’s [14] conjecture as noted in Section 3.1. We make
two observations. (i) Non-extreme users pump more than the ex-
treme ones in period 1, while the opposite is true in period 2. (ii)
The total water usage may exceed the initial stock levels for some
users. Table 3 tabulates the total discounted proﬁt per user in the
decentralized problem.We note that the proﬁts are consistent with
the total water usage; that is, highest proﬁts are obtained by the
second to extreme users. Likewise, proﬁts are also symmetric
around the midpoints and non-monotone. However, the least prof-
its are not realized by the extreme users, which may be attributed
to the non-linear nature of the proﬁt function. It is worth noting
that, under the time-variant settings, users exhibit the same
behavior in pumpage and in proﬁt realization, and, hence, we skip
giving their results.
Example 2. We now consider the ring conﬁguration with the same
settings above. Table 4 summarizes the corresponding numerical
results. We observe that users pump more and realize more proﬁts
under the time-variant settings compared to the time-invariant
one. The corresponding centralized solutions are found from
Corollary 8, which are the same as those found in Corollary 4
above in the strip conﬁguration. Fig. 1a depicts the values of R1%
versus the number of users n for strip and ring conﬁgurations for
the data tabulated in Tables 1 and 4 corresponding to the time-
invariant setting. We observe that R1% increases concavely in the
number of users. This implies that users become more greedy as
more users share the resource, however the tendency to pump
more water diminishes. As expected, for both conﬁgurations, the
Fig. 1. (R1% vs. n), (Total discounted proﬁts vs. a): time-invariant setting.
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problem. However, for nP 3, the strip conﬁguration yields more
discounted proﬁts than the ring conﬁguration in the decentralized
problem. This occurs because, users in the strip conﬁguration
exhibit an oscillating greedy behavior of pumping in period 1
where they pump more water than they do in the ring conﬁgu-
ration. Again, it is worth noting that users show the same behavior
in their R1% under the time-variant settings and, hence, their
corresponding ﬁgures are not given.Table 5
Total discounted proﬁt vs. a: strip conﬁguration.
a u1;1;u

1;2
  ðu2;1;u2;2Þ u3;1;u3;2 
0 (.5, .5) (.5, .5) (.5, .5)
.05 (.5325, .4658) (.5675, .4343) (.5675, .4343)
.10 (.5649, .4276) (.6402, .3673) (.6402, .3673)
.15 (.5972, .3846) (.7185, .2997) (.7185, .2997)
.20 (.6295, .3359) (.8025, .2321) (.8025, .2321)
.25 (.6616, .2807) (.8925, .1652) (.8925, .1652)
.30 (.6939, .2177) (.9885, .0999) (.9885, .0999)
.35 (.7339, .1729) (1, .0931) (1, .0931)
.40 (.7772, .1337) (1, .0891) (1, .0891)
.45 (.8230, .0974) (1, .0797) (1, .0797)
.50 (.8709, .0646) (1, .0646) (1, .0646)Example 3. In this example, we examine the effect of a 2 [0,0.5] on
the total decentralized discounted proﬁts in both conﬁgurations for
n = 4 identical users. Here, we assume that users have perfect infor-
mation about the soil transmissivity and treat a as a deterministic
parameter. We set qi,t = 1, ai,t = 10, bi,t = 5 and ci,t = 2 for all i and t,
(i.e., the time-invariant setting). Tables 5 and 6 summarize the
results for the strip and ring conﬁgurations, respectively. In both
tables, MP% ¼ eC1  Ci;1 h i=eC1  100% stands for the percentage
rate of decrease in discounted proﬁt of the decentralized problem
relative to that in the centralized problem. In the strip conﬁguration,
the unconstrained solution for a 2 [0.35,0.5], resulted in infeasible
solutions; u2;1 ¼ u3;1 > 1 and u1;1 ¼ u4;1 < 1. Hence, we obtained
the constrained solution numerically, u2;1 ¼ u3;1 ¼ 1, (i.e.
d2 ¼ d3 > 0) and u1;1 ¼ u4;1 < 1, (i.e. d1 ¼ d4 ¼ 0). Similarly, the
unconstrained solutions are suboptimal for the ring conﬁguration
for a 2 [0.35,0.5]. The optimal solution obtained numerically
results in all users are depleting their total available stock of water
in period 1, ui;1 ¼ 1 and di ¼ 0, for i = 1, 2, 3, 4. We note that in both
conﬁgurations, as a increases, users experience more effects of
hydrologic dynamics and becomemore greedy tending to use more
water in period 1. Fig. 1b depicts the total discounted proﬁts with
respect to a in both conﬁgurations. As observed from the ﬁgure, the
total discounted proﬁts are non-increasing in a regardless of the
conﬁguration. However, the rate of decrease, MP%, in the strip con-
ﬁguration is always lower than that in the ring for a 2 [0,0.50]. It is
important to note that in both conﬁgurations, the maximum dis-
counted proﬁt is attained in the centralized setting where the real-
ized total discounted proﬁt is 31.33. However, both centralized and
decentralized problems achieve the same value of total discounted
proﬁts when there is no lateral ﬂow between users (i.e., when
a = 0), as expected.6. Conclusions
In this work, we consider ground water usage when the re-
sources are shared among n users under centralized and decentral-
ized management settings. Our work extends the results of Saak
and Peterson [14] to n non-identical users by considering two dif-
ferent user conﬁgurations - strip and ring - overlying a common
groundwater aquifer. It is assumed that transmission of the
groundwater is governed by Darcy’s Law, which induces a special
interaction type among the users between the periods. For a qua-
dratic periodic proﬁt function, general analytical solutions related
to the optimal Nash equilibrium usage for the decentralized prob-
lem are obtained for both strip and ring transmission conﬁgura-
tions for a two-period planning horizon. Also, we are able to
arrive at more compact analytical results for the special case of
identical users for the centralized and the decentralized problems
in both conﬁgurations. However, in both conﬁgurations, theðu4;1;u4;2Þ eC1ð~u1;~x1Þ Pni¼1Ci;1ð~u1;~x1Þ MP%
(.5, .5) 31.33 31.33 0
(.5325, .4658) 31.33 30.94 1.25
(.5649, .4276) 31.33 30.76 1.82
(.5972, .3846) 31.33 30.44 2.84
(.6295, .3359) 31.33 29.95 4.4
(.6616, .2807) 31.33 29.26 6.6
(.6939, .2177) 31.33 28.35 9.51
(.7339, .1729) 31.33 28.06 10.4
(.7772, .1337) 31.33 27.80 11.27
(.8230, .0974) 31.33 27.50 12.22
(.8709, .0646) 31.33 27.15 13.34
Table 6
Total discounted proﬁt vs. a: ring conﬁguration.
a u1;1;u

1;2
 
u2;1;u

2;2
 
u3;1;u

3;2
 
u4;1;u

4;2
  eC1ð~u1;~x1Þ Pni¼1Ci;1ð~u1;~x1Þ MP%
0 (.5, .5) (.5, .5) (.5, .5) (.5, .5) 31.33 31.33 0
.05 (.5670, .4330) (.5670, .4330) (.5670, .4330) (.5670, .4330) 31.33 30.91 1.34
.10 (.6383, .3617) (.6383, .3617) (.6383, .3617) (.6383, .3617) 31.33 30.62 2.17
.15 (.7143, .2857) (.7143, .2857) (.7143, .2857) (.7143, .2857) 31.33 30.08 4
.20 (.7955, .2045) (.7955, .2045) (.7955, .2045) (.7955, .2045) 31.33 29.25 6.64
.25 (.8824, .1176) (.8824, .1176) (.8824, .1176) (.8824, .1176) 31.33 28.08 10.4
.30 (.9756, .0244) (.9756, .0244) (.9756, .0244) (.9756, .0244) 31.33 26.48 15.5
.35 (1,0) (1,0) (1,0) (1,0) 31.33 26 17
.40 (1,0) (1,0) (1,0) (1,0) 31.33 26 17
.45 (1,0) (1,0) (1,0) (1,0) 31.33 26 17
.50 (1,0) (1,0) (1,0) (1,0) 31.33 26 17
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game-theoretic setting through a single pricing mechanism (i.e.
no coordination). Our analytical results reveal that in strip conﬁg-
uration with identical users, the optimal Nash equilibrium usage
quantities oscillate about the optimal Nash equilibrium usage
quantities of the ring conﬁguration. We also note that although
the optimal solutions of the strip structure do not converge to that
of the ring structure as the number of users increase, they are ob-
served to become very close in our numerical examples for the
non-extreme users of the strip. In our numerical results of time-
invariant setting, we observe that, in both strip and ring conﬁgura-
tions in decentralized problems, as the underground water trans-
mission coefﬁcient increases, users become more greedy and use
more water. This greedy behavior however adversely affects the
system’s total discounted proﬁt. On the other hand, we investigate
the water pumping behavior of users under the time-variant set-
ting by varying one parameter at a time and keeping the rest as
in the time-invariant setting. In particular, we study the effect of
changing the crop unit price and yield function parameters on
the optimal solution as well as on the realized total proﬁts in the
centralized and decentralized problems. In all settings (variant
and invariant), the centralized solutions always dominate the
decentralized ones by achieving more proﬁts.
In the presence of a salvage function for leftover water stock at
the end of problem horizon, we observe that, in both conﬁgura-
tions, the centralized solution dominates the decentralized one
by realizing more proﬁts from water usage. Also, in the strip con-
ﬁguration, water usage ﬂuctuates from ends toward the midpoints
of the strip. Additionally, in both conﬁgurations and in both prob-
lems, users allocate part of their available water stocks in the sec-
ond period to satisfy demands other than the irrigation ones
through selling it out according to the given quadratic salvage va-
lue function. In the sequel, under this setting, the policy makers
(users and social planner) have more ﬂexibility in allocating their
water stock in the second period among two different sources of
water demand. Our ﬁndings ﬁt within the broader literature on
management and operating policy making for usage of limited nat-
ural resources. We hope that, in the context of groundwater man-
agement, our results will aid the decision makers in developing
and adopting control policies for more effective and fair usage of
limited resources.
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Appendix A. A model with salvage
In this section, we incorporate into our models the possibility of
salvaging remaining stock. We assume that it is not necessary forthe available stock of water at the beginning of period 2, xi,2, to
be completely consumed in irrigation. More speciﬁcally, part of
xi,2 which represents the pumpage quantity in period 2, ui,2, is used
to satisfy irrigation demands while the remaining part, (xi,2  ui,2),
is salvaged. We assume a quadratic salvage value function for the
unused water quantity in period 2, (xi,2  ui,2), for i = 1, . . . ,n, given
by
sv i;2ðui;2; xi;2Þ ¼ fi;1ðxi;2  ui;2Þ  0:5f i;2ðxi;2  ui;2Þ2; ð16Þ
where fi,t is positive and allowed to vary over time, i = 1, . . . ,n, t = 1,
2. Now, we let ~gi;2ðui;2; xi;2Þ ¼ gi;2ðui;2; xi;2Þ þ sv i;2ðui;2; xi;2Þ. To ﬁnd the
optimal water pumpage quantity ui;2, we optimize ~gi;2ðui;2; xi;2Þ with
respect to ui,2. Speciﬁcally, we ﬁnd the unconstrained solution of
~gi;2ðui;2; xi;2Þ and determine its feasibility conditions. The uncon-
strained solution is found by solving the FOC of ~gi;2ðui;2; xi;2Þ. From
@~gi;2ð; Þ=@ui;2 ¼ @gi;2ð; Þ=@ui;2 þ @sv i;2ð; Þ=@ui;2 ¼ 0, the uncon-
strained solution is given by
ui;2 ¼
qi;2ai;2 þ ðci;2 þ fi;2Þxi;2  ci;2xi;0  fi;1
qi;2bi;2 þ ci;2 þ fi;2
: ð17Þ
To guarantee the feasibility of Eq. (17), the following condition
should hold
ci;2xi;0 þ fi;1  ðci;2 þ fi;2Þxi;2 < qi;2ai;2
< ci;2xi;0 þ fi;1 þ qi;2bi;2xi;2: ð18Þ
If Eq. (18) holds, then ui;2 ¼ ui;2, for i = 1, . . . ,n. We observe that
gi,1(ui,1,xi,1) is concave in ui,1 since @2gi,1(, )/@ (ui,1)2 = (qi,1bi,1 + -
ci,1) < 0, i = 1, . . . ,n. Also, we notice that @
2~gi;2ð; Þ=@ðui;2Þ2 ¼ 
ðqi;2bi;2 þ ci;2 þ fi;2Þ < 0, implying that ~gi;2ðui;2; xi;2Þ is concave in ui,2,
i = 1, . . . ,n. Therefore, gi,1(ui,1,xi,1) and ~gi;2ðui;2; xi;2Þ are continuous
and concave in their respective decision variables, for all i. To avoid
repetition of similar results in the original model, we only present
the changes that might appear under this new model in the results
of the strip and ring conﬁgurations.
A.1. Strip conﬁguration: the decentralized problem
For t = 1, 2, and i = 1, . . . ,n, the decentralized problem of user i is
given by
Ci;1ð~u1;~x1Þ ¼ maxui;1 Ci;1ð
~u1;~x1Þ ¼ max
ui;1
gi;1ðui;1; xi;1Þ þ b~gi;2 ui;2; xi;2
 h i
;ð19Þ
s:t: ð4Þ and ð5Þ
The function Ci;1ð~u1;~x1Þ is continuous and jointly concave in ~u1 if
and only if the following condition holds for all i
2ci;2ðci;2 þ fi;2Þðqi;2bi;2 þ ci;2 þ fi;2Þ  ðqi;2bi;2Þ2fi;2  ðci;2 þ fi;2Þ
 ðqi;2bi;2 þ ci;2Þ 6 0: ð20Þ
Proposition 2 of the original model holds for this model. Also, Prop-
osition 3 holds with
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bð1aÞ2
y2 z ðqi;1bi;1 þ ci;1Þ; i ¼ 1;n;
bð12aÞ2
y2 z ðqi;1bi;1 þ ci;1Þ; o:w:
8<: ;
ri ¼
bað1aÞ
y2 z; i ¼ 1
bað12aÞ
y2 z; o:w:
8<: ;
i ¼
bað1aÞ
y2 z; i¼n1;
bað12aÞ
y2 z; o:w:
8<: and
ki ¼
bð1aÞ
y2 ½v0yþv1qi;1ai;1; i¼1;n;
bð12aÞ
y2 ½v0yþv1qi;1ai;1; o:w:
8<:
where, for i = 1, . . . ,n, y = qi,2bi,2 + ci,2 + fi,2, z = (ci,2 + fi,2)[2ci,2y 
(ci,2 + fi,2)(qi,2bi,2 + ci,2)]  (qi,2bi,2)2fi,2,v0 = (2ci,2 + fi,2)qi,2ai,2 + 2ci,2-
(ci,2 + fi,2)w1 + ci,2(fi,2xi,0  fi,1) and v1 = qi,2bi,2[fi,1(qi,2bi,2 + ci,2) 
qi,2bi,2fi,2(xi,0 + w1) + qi,2ai,2fi,2  ci,2fi,2xi,0]  (qi,2bi,2 + ci,2)(ci,2 + fi,2)
[qi,2ai,2 + fi,2xi,0 + (ci,2 + fi,2)w1  fi,1]. Accordingly, Corollary 2 holds
with c ¼ bð1aÞ2y2 z ðq1b1 þ c1Þ,  ¼ bð12aÞ
2
y2 zðq1b1þc1Þ, x¼ bað1aÞy2 z,
r¼ bað12aÞy2 z, g¼ bð1aÞy2 ½v0yþ v1q1a1, k¼ bð12aÞy2 ½v0yþv1q1a1, y =
q2b2 + c2 + f2, z = (c2 + f2)[2c2y  (c2 + f2)(q2b2 + c2)]  (q2b2)2 f2, v0 =
(2c2 + f2)q2a2 + 2c2(c2 + f2)w1 + c2(f2x0  f1) and v1 = q2b2[f1(q2b2 +
c2)  q2b2f2(x0 + w1) + q2a2f2  c2f2x0]  (q2b2 + c2)(c2 + f2) [q2a2 +
f2x0 + (c2 + f2)w1  f1].
A.2. Strip conﬁguration: the centralized problem
The centralized problem under this setting has the same form of
that given in Eq. (12) subject to the constraints in Eqs. (4) and (7).
Similarly, if the condition in Eq. (20) holds, then eC1ð~u1;~x1Þ is contin-
uous and jointly concave in~u1, for all i. Fundamentally, Proposition 4
of the original model holds under this setting. However, the coefﬁ-
cients e(i,i) and the right hand sides hi, for i = 1, . . . ,n, will be very
messy, and, hence, we skip writing their formulae. For identical
users, the elements of matrix eA and the right hand sidefW in Section
3.2 become /1 ¼ ðq1b1 þ c1Þ þ bð1 2aþ 2a2Þ ~zy, /2 ¼ bð2a
3a2Þ ~zy, /3 ¼ ba2 ~zy, x1 ¼ ðq1b1 þ c1Þ þ bð1 4aþ 6a2Þ ~zy, x2 ¼ /1
x1 ¼ 2bað1 2aÞ ~zy and h ¼ b ~yy q1a1, where y = q2b2 + c2 + f2,
~z ¼ y½ðc2 þ 1Þðc2 þ f2Þyþ ðq2b2 þ c2Þðc2 þ f2Þ2  ðq2b2Þ2f2 and ~y ¼
ðc2 þ f2Þðq2a2  c2w1Þ þ ðq2a2 þ f2x1  c2w1  f1Þ½1þ ðc2 þ f2Þðq2b2þ
c2Þ  q2b2f1  f2y ½q2a2 q2b2  c2ðx1 þw1Þ  f1. The following re-
sult gives the solution of the centralized problem for identical users
which is equivalent to Corollary 4 and, hence, its proof is omitted.
Corollary 10. Uniqueness of the global maximizer and optimality
for identical users).
(i) Suppose that users are identical. Then, eC1ð~u1;~x1Þ is unique and
given byui;1 ¼ u ¼ ½b~y q1a1y=½b~z ðq1b1 þ c1Þy; 8i:
(ii) If 0 6 ui;1 6 x1, for all i, then the optimal solution for the cen-
tralized problem is given by u⁄⁄ above.
Corollary 5 holds as well in this setting.A.3. Ring conﬁguration: the decentralized problem
Similar to the strip’s decentralized problem,Ci;1ð~u1;~x1Þ is contin-
uous and jointly concave in~u1 if and only if the condition in Eq. (20)
is satisﬁed for all i. Proposition6 hold under this setting aswell. Also,
Proposition 7 holds with i ¼ bð12aÞ
2
y2 z ðqi;1bi;1 þ ci;1Þ, ri ¼ bað12aÞy2 z,
ki ¼ bð12aÞy2 ½v0yþ v1  qi;1ai;1, and y, z, v0 and v1 are as deﬁnedbefore
in the strip conﬁguration. Furthermore, Corollary 6 holds in this
setting.
A.4. Ring conﬁguration: the centralized problem
Similar to the strip’s centralized problem, if the condition in Eq.
(20) holds, then eC1ð~u1;~x1Þ is continuous and jointly concave in ~u1,
for all i. Fundamentally, Proposition 8 of the original model holds
under this setting. However, the coefﬁcients e(i,i) and the right hand
sides /i, for i = 1, . . . ,n, will be very messy, and, hence, we skip writ-
ing their formulae. In the identical case, we observe that the ele-
ments of matrix eB in Section 4.2 are /i, i = 1, 2, 3, xi, i = 1, 2 and
h are as deﬁned above in matrix eA of the strip conﬁguration. The
optimal solution of the centralized problem corresponding to the
ring conﬁguration give the same solution given in Corollary 10.
Corollary 9 holds under this setting as well.
Appendix B. Supplementary data
Supplementary data associated with this article can be found, in
the online version, at doi:10.1016/j.ejor.2011.05.048.
References
[1] R. Allen, M. Gisser, Competition versus optimal control in groundwater
pumping when demand is nonlinear, Water Resources Research 20 (7)
(1984) 752–756.
[2] M. Azaiez, M. Hariga, A single-period model for conjunctive use of ground and
surface water under severe overdrafts and water deﬁcit, European Journal of
Operational Research 133 (2001) 653–666.
[3] M. Azaiez, A model for conjunctive use of ground and surface water with
opportunity costs, European Journal of Operational Research 142 (2002) 611–
624.
[4] M. Azaiez, M. Hariga, M. Al-Harkan, A chance-constrained multi-period model
for a special multi-reservoir system, Computer and Operations Research 32
(2005) 1337–1351.
[5] P. Dasgubta, E. Maskin, The existence of equilibrium in discontinuous
economic games, I: theory, Review of Economic Studies 53 (1986) 1–26.
[6] S. Elaydi, An Introduction to Difference Equations, 3rd ed., Springer, United
Kingdom, 2005. Chapter 2.
[7] M. Gisser, D. Sanchez, Competitive versus optimal control in groundwater
pumping, Water Resources Research 16 (4) (1980) 638–642.
[8] M. Haouari, M. Azaiez, Optimal cropping patterns under water deﬁcits,
European Journal of Operational Research 130 (2001) 133–146.
[9] G. Hornberger, P. Wiberg, J. Eshleman, Elements of Physical Hydrology, John
Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, 1998 (Chapter 6).
[10] J. Labadie, Optimal operations of multireservoir systems: state-of-the-art
review, Water Resources Research 130 (2) (2004) 93–111.
[11] D. Negri, The common property aquifer as a differential game, Water
Resources Research 25 (1) (1989) 9–15.
[12] J. Nocedal, S. Wright, Numerical Optimization, 2nd ed., Springer Series in
Operations Research, United States of America, 2006 (Chapter 16).
[13] J. Peterson, Y. Ding, Economic adjustments to groundwater depletion in the
high plains: do water-saving irrigation systems save water?, American Journal
of Agricultural Economics 87 (1) (2005) 147–159
[14] A. Saak, J. Peterson, Groundwater use under incomplete information, Journal of
Environmental Economics and Management 54 (2007) 214–228.
[15] W. Yeh, Reservoir management and operations models: state-of-the-art
review, Water Resources Research 21 (12) (1985) 1797–1818.
